Supporting the development of a health benefits package in Malawi. by Ochalek, Jessica et al.
Ochalek, J; Revill, P; Manthalu, G; McGuire, F; Nkhoma, D; Rollinger,
A; Sculpher, M; Claxton, K (2018) Supporting the development of a
health benefits package in Malawi. BMJ global health, 3 (2). e000607.
ISSN 2059-7908 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4647402/
DOI: 10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/
 1Ochalek J, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607
Supporting the development of a health 
benefits package in Malawi
Jessica Ochalek,1 Paul Revill,1 Gerald Manthalu,2 Finn McGuire,3 
Dominic Nkhoma,4 Alexandra Rollinger,1 Mark Sculpher,1 Karl Claxton1
Practice
To cite: Ochalek J, Revill P, 
Manthalu G, et al. Supporting 
the development of a 
health benefits package in 
Malawi. BMJ Glob Health 
2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/
bmjgh-2017-000607
Handling editor Seye Abimbola
 ► Additional material is 
published online only. To view 
please visit the journal online 
(http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1136/ 
bmjgh- 2017- 000607).
Received 13 October 2017
Revised 19 February 2018
Accepted 15 March 2018
1Centre for Health Economics, 
University of York, York, UK
2Department of Planning and 
Policy Development, Ministry of 
Health, Lilongwe, Malawi
3Department of Global Health 
and Development, London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK
4Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water 
Development, Lilongwe, Malawi
Correspondence to
Jessica Ochalek, Centre for 
Health Economics, University of 
York, York, UK ;  
 jessica. ochalek@ york. ac. uk,  
 jessica. ochalek@ york. ac. uk
AbsTrACT
Malawi, like many low-income and middle-income 
countries, has used health benefits packages (HBPs) to 
allocate scarce resources to key healthcare interventions. 
With no widely accepted method for their development, 
HBPs often promise more than can be delivered, given 
available resources. An analytical framework is developed 
to guide the design of HBPs that can identify the 
potential value of including and implementing different 
interventions. It provides a basis for informing meaningful 
discussions between governments, donors and other 
stakeholders around the trade-offs implicit in package 
design. Metrics of value, founded on an understanding 
of the health opportunity costs of the choices faced, are 
used to quantify the scale of the potential net health 
impact (net disability adjusted life years averted) or the 
amount of additional healthcare resources that would 
be required to deliver similar net health impacts with 
existing interventions (the financial value to the healthcare 
system). The framework can be applied to answer key 
questions around, for example: the appropriate scale of 
the HBP; which interventions represent ‘best buys’ and 
should be prioritised; where investments in scaling up 
interventions and health system strengthening should be 
made; whether the package should be expanded; costs of 
the conditionalities of donor funding and how objectives 
beyond improving population health can be considered. 
This is illustrated using data from Malawi. The framework 
was successfully applied to inform the HBP in Malawi, as 
a core component of the country’s Health Sector Strategic 
Plan II 2017–2022.
InTroduCTIon
Sustainable Development Goal target 3.8 is to 
‘Achieve universal health coverage, including 
financial risk protection, access to quality 
essential healthcare services and access to 
safe, effective, quality and affordable essen-
tial medicines and vaccines for all’ by 2030.1 
However, the resources available for health-
care are limited, so not all services can be 
provided. Health benefits packages (HBPs) 
are an increasingly common way of explicitly 
defining which health services are provided 
through public expenditure as progress is 
made towards Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC).2–4 At least 64 low-income and 
middle-income countries (LMICs) defined 
some form of HBP by 2012.4 5 However, pack-
ages vary widely in terms of how benefits are 
defined, the cost of the packages, the coverage 
levels actually achieved and the methods used 
to inform their design.3 4 
Summary box
What is already known about this topic?
 ► Health benefits packages (HBPs) are commonly 
used to set out what should be included in 
a publicly subsidised package of healthcare 
interventions to make progress towards the 
Sustainable Development Goal target 3.8 of 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in low-income and 
middle-income countries (LMICs).
 ► HBP design has typically failed to take proper 
account of all constraints faced (eg, healthcare 
expenditure, infrastructure and donor restrictions) 
and has not been informed by explicit analysis that 
can identify the potential value of including and 
implementing different interventions; as a result, 
HBPs are rarely fully implemented and so access to 
the most valuable interventions is restricted.
What are the new findings?
 ► The analytic framework is founded on an 
understanding of the health opportunity costs of 
the choices faced and so can offer a transparent, 
principles-based approach to informing the content 
and scale of a HBP with existing resources, the 
value of expanding the HBP and the incremental 
reallocation of resources within the package.
 ► An assessment of health opportunity costs makes 
it possible to report the potential net health impact 
(net disability adjusted life years averted) of 
including a particular intervention or the amount 
of additional healthcare resources that would 
be required to deliver similar net health impacts 
(financial value to the healthcare system).
 ► This enables interventions that should be prioritised 
to be identified and the value of implementation 
efforts and health system strengthening to be 
assessed and also indicates the value of expanding 
the package, the costs of the conditionalities of 
donor funding and the trade-offs required when 
considering other objectives.
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Despite the frequent and increasing use of HBPs in 
LMICs, package design often suffers from a number of 
common flaws. The process of benefits package design is 
often non-transparent, non-inclusive and not informed 
by explicit analysis that makes best use of the often-lim-
ited evidence available. Decisions can, therefore, appear 
ad hoc rather than evidence-based. In particular, anal-
ysis rarely reflects the impact of various constraints on 
intervention provision and uptake. Therefore, the health 
opportunity cost of decisions is seldom accounted for. 
These issues are highly context-specific and ultimately 
affect the scale of the additional benefits and costs of 
including particular interventions. Attempts have been 
made to address some of the evidential shortcomings with 
‘global public goods’ (eg, the DCP series). However, they 
often fail to address local conditions such as constraints 
on provision and uptake. As a result, packages generally 
promise more than they can deliver and healthcare is 
implicitly rationed with the most essential care not neces-
sarily being delivered.3 If HBPs are to advance UHC goals 
in a way that makes best use of the resources available 
for healthcare and informs how additional resources 
can most productively and equitably be used, an analytic 
framework is required that exposes the inevitable trade-
offs to assist decision makers in their design.5
Such a framework was developed in response to a 
request by the Ministry of Health of Malawi to researchers 
at the Centre for Health Economics, University of York 
for an analytic framework to guide resource allocation 
within the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2017–2022 (HSSP 
II). The framework needed to inform key questions 
posed by the Ministry of Health:
 ► What is the appropriate scale of the HBP?
 ► Which interventions represent ‘best buys’ for the 
healthcare system (HCS) and should be prioritised?
 ► Where should investments in scaling up interventions 
and health system strengthening be made?
 ► Should the package be expanded to include addition-
al interventions?
 ► What are the costs of the conditionalities of donor 
funding?
 ► How can objectives beyond improving population 
health be considered?
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The 
health policy context in Malawi is initially introduced. 
Then the framework for designing HBPs is described, 
and an illustrative analysis is presented to answer each of 
the questions posed by applying the framework to data 
from Malawi. The application of the framework by the 
Malawian government to the development of a HBP for 
the HSSP-II is described, before the applicability of the 
framework to other settings and suggestions for future 
work are discussed.
HeAlTH polICy ConTexT In MAlAWI
Malawi introduced its first essential health package 
(EHP) in 2004 as a means of allocating collectively 
pooled resources for healthcare in conjunction with the 
initiation of a health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) to 
funding and resource allocation.6 As part of the SWAp, 
donors provided general budget support and resource 
allocation decisions were made centrally by Govern-
ment.7 This replaced a fragmented vertical disease-based 
approach to funding.8 The donor share of funding for 
the SWAp gradually increased from 30% in 2004/2005 
to 56% in 2006/2007.9 However, following the ‘cashgate’ 
scandal of 2013, many donors moved away from general 
budget support.10 11 In the 2014/2015 financial year, 
donors contributed only 8% of SWAp pool resources, 
while the remaining 92% (MK65.8 billion) were raised 
domestically,12 with donors instead returning to vertical 
disease-based funding channels. In FY 2015/2016, 
on-budget funding (ie, government-raised funds and 
direct budget support from donors) made up only 32% of 
total funding while the remainder was mostly off-budget 
discrete project support.12 13
Despite the changing fiscal and political landscape, 
Malawi has continued to use HBPs to prioritise spending 
from both government and donor partners in the health 
sector. However, its first two HBPs in 2004 and 20116 14 
were unsustainable, estimated to cost between 83% and 
182% of total health expenditure, of which the package 
forms only a part.6 14–16 As is common with packages 
globally, the HBPs could not be implemented resulting 
in inequitable variations in access to care and in many 
circumstances priority ‘best buy’ interventions were not 
available.17
A frAMeWork for desIgnIng Hbps
To address the policy questions in Malawi, a general 
framework was required that enabled the quantification 
of the health gains that would result from different poten-
tial HBPs (ie, with different choices of interventions) and 
account for actual constraints on implementation, donor 
restrictions and objectives other than health improve-
ment. Including an intervention in the HBP commits 
Summary box
What are the recommendations for policy and practice?
 ► The purpose of this analytic framework is not to prescribe a 
particular package or what health expenditure ought to be, rather 
it shows how evidence, such as it is, can be marshalled and 
analysis presented in a way that can empower Ministries of Health 
(MoH) as they engage with a range of stakeholders in making 
explicit, accountable and evidence-based decisions.
 ► The framework can contribute to advancing UHC goals in a 
way that makes best use of the resources available and shows 
the value of committing additional resources for healthcare, 
addressing common challenges and trade-offs faced by diverse 
healthcare systems in LMICs.
 ► The successful application by the Malawian MoH in developing 
Malawi’s Health Sector Strategic Plan II (2017–2022) 
demonstrates its practicality in making best use of often-limited 
evidence in a low-income country setting.
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resources that could otherwise have funded other inter-
ventions that also improve health. These forgone inter-
ventions and their associated health improvements repre-
sent the health opportunity cost of including a particular 
intervention in the HBP.
An explicit and evidence-based assessment of 
health opportunity costs enables metrics of value to 
be reported. These indicate the scale of the poten-
tial health impact of including an intervention in the 
HBP net of associated health opportunity costs and 
of ensuring it is fully implemented. This information 
can be reported in health or monetary terms, which 
in turn can inform the value of committing resources 
to implementation efforts. These metrics of value (see 
box 1) inform prioritisation decisions more directly 
than other measures that have been used previously. 
For example, estimates of burden of disease or cost-ef-
fectiveness ratios do not indicate the scale of popula-
tion health benefits offered by providing interventions 
to defined populations.18 19
The illustrative analysis that follows relies on an empir-
ical estimate of health opportunity costs (see box 2) and 
uses estimates of the costs and health effects of interven-
tions from the Tufts Global Health Cost-Effectiveness Registry 
and WHO CHOosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective 
(WHO-CHOICE) analyses. Budgetary analysis to deter-
mine the total cost of the package uses drug and supply 
costs from a 2014 costing mid-term review of the previous 
HSSP made available by in-country partners Palladium 
and the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI). The 
size of eligible patient populations for each intervention 
and an assessment of the levels to which interventions 
were actually implemented in Malawi in 2014 use bottle-
neck analysis and data from CHAI. Therefore, the data 
requirements do not extend far beyond the data collected 
regularly in many LMIC health systems. Shortfalls in data 
availability are inevitable, in any environment, but the 
framework allows the best use to be made of routinely 
collected local data, which complements relevant and 
available globally available data, within decision-making 
processes.
InforMIng key quesTIons In Hbp desIgn
What is the appropriate scale of the Hbp?
Figure 1 shows the interventions for which all required 
estimates were available, ordered and numbered from the 
lowest (left) to highest (right) ratio of cost per disability 
adjusted life year (DALY) averted. The height of each bar 
represents the intervention’s effectiveness-cost ratio, and 
the width of each bar represents the intervention’s total 
cost.20 The latter is a function of the number of patients 
that require it and the cost per patient of delivering it, 
assuming each intervention is fully implemented. If Malawi 
can currently afford to pay up to $61 to avert one DALY 
(ie, 16 DALYs averted per $1000, see box 2), interventions 
1–48 would be included in the HBP resulting in a budget of 
$265 million (shown as vertical dashed line A).
The estimate of $61 per DALY might be regarded as 
too low if policy makers felt able to commit more funding 
to healthcare given the size of other budgets and overall 
public resources. Higher estimates imply an expanded 
EHP with a larger budget. Once the health that is likely 
to be delivered by greater healthcare expenditure is 
set out, it then becomes possible to have a more mean-
ingful deliberation about how Malawi’s public finance 
resources might be allocated between competing claims 
(health education, infrastructure and so on) and/or how 
increases in public finance to accommodate increased 
health expenditure might be achieved.
For example, if the widely cited norms of 1 or 3 GDP 
per capita are adopted, the ‘threshold’ would be $372 or 
$1116 per DALY averted, with interventions 1–60 or 1–65 
included, implying a budget of $362 or $380 million, respec-
tively, as indicated by dashed lines B and C.21 It should be 
noted that in this illustrative example only those interven-
tions where estimates of cost, health benefit, eligible popu-
lation and level of implementation were available were 
Box 1 Metrics of value
 ► Net disability adjusted life years (DALYs) averted represent the 
net health impact of an intervention on population health. It is 
the difference between the DALYs averted by an intervention and 
DALYs that could have been averted if the money required to 
deliver it had been spent on other interventions. If the intervention 
saves resources, it is the DALYs averted by the intervention plus 
the DALYs that can also be averted by including other interventions 
with the cost savings offered.
 ► The financial value to the healthcare system (the value of the 
intervention expressed in monetary terms) is the amount of 
additional healthcare resources that would be required to deliver 
the equivalent net DALYs averted with other interventions.
Box 2 estimating health opportunity costs
 ► Recent research, although in high-income countries, has 
demonstrated that an empirical assessment of health opportunity 
costs is possible based on estimates of the health effects of 
changes in healthcare expenditure.28–30
 ► Some of these estimates have been used to infer possible health 
opportunity costs in low-income  and middle-income countries 
(LMICs).31
 ► Published estimates of the effect of changes in health expenditure 
on mortality using country-level data, including LMICs, can also 
be used to estimate health opportunity costs (cost per disability 
adjusted life year (DALY) averted) for particular healthcare system, 
reflecting their demography, epidemiology, healthcare expenditure, 
income and other characteristics.32
 ► The results of this type of empirical estimation suggest that the 
GDP per capita-based ‘thresholds’ that have been widely used 
to judge cost-effectiveness in LMICs are likely to be significantly 
higher than an assessment of health opportunity costs.
 ► In Malawi, the range of estimates available suggests that $61 
spent on healthcare at the margin would be expected to avert one 
DALY.31 32
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included. Since other possible interventions are missing 
from figure 1, the difference in total budget for increases 
in the ‘threshold’ will tend to be underestimated, especially 
if high-cost interventions are under-represented. This also 
illustrates the experience of previous EHPs in Malawi and 
many other LMICs, where adopting ‘threshold’ norms that 
exceed the reality of health opportunity costs results in 
the inclusion of more in the package than can actually be 
funded. This leads to arbitrary and inequitable rationing, 
reduced health impact of the more limited resources that 
are actually available.5
Which interventions represent ‘best buys’ for the healthcare 
system and should be prioritised?
While figure 1 provides a useful way to visualise the budget 
implications of using a higher or lower ‘threshold’ value, 
cost per DALY averted ratios are not useful for prioritising 
interventions because they do not indicate the scale of 
the potential health impact. Table 1 ranks interventions 
according to the net DALYs averted that they achieve, 
again initially assuming they are fully implemented.
Ranking interventions by the net DALYs they avert 
results in a different ordering than ranking by ratios 
because the net DALYs averted reflects the size of the 
patient population as well as the individual health effect 
and costs. For example, management of obstructed 
labour, which is ranked 30th (ie, intervention 30) by 
cost-effectiveness ratios, is ranked second by net benefit 
because it generates a large health impact and remains 
higher than other interventions even when health oppor-
tunity costs are considered. The intervention ranked first 
Figure 1 DALYs averted per $1000 and different budgets. ART, antiretroviral therapy; DALY, disability adjusted life year; 
GIT, gastrointestinal; ITN, insecticide-treated bed net; IPT, intermittent preventive therapy; LLIN, long-lasting insecticidal 
net; ORS, oral rehydration salts; PMTCT, prevention of mother to child transmission; pPRoM, preterm premature rupture of 
membranes. 
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by cost-effectiveness ratios (ie, intervention 1—cotrimox-
azole prophylaxis for children) averts fewer net DALYs 
than other interventions that impose costs on the system, 
despite being cost saving.
Those interventions to the right of the dashed line ‘A’ 
in figure 1 would result in negative overall population 
health impacts (ie, negative net DALYs averted) if they 
had been included in the package, as shown in table 1. 
This is because the cost associated with those interven-
tions could be used elsewhere to better effect (ie, the 
resources would generate higher DALYs averted than if 
used for these particular interventions).
Interventions that represent ‘best buys’ for the HCS 
and should be prioritised are those that generate the 
most net health. These include HIV prevention strate-
gies (including prevention, testing and treatment strat-
egies); treatment for tuberculosis; maternal and child 
health interventions (such as management of pre-ec-
lampsia, caesarean section and labour and delivery 
management) and prevention of and treatment for 
malaria.
Where should investments in scaling up interventions and 
health system strengthening be made?
In Malawi, the mean actual implementation level in 2014 
among all interventions included in the analysis is 46%, 
with a range of 1%–100%. Constraints to implementa-
tion include, on the demand side, individuals’ lack of 
perceived benefits of care and difficulty in getting to 
clinics due to poor road infrastructure and, on the supply 
side, lack of equipment, lack of trained staff, supply chain 
bottlenecks, lack of beds, water and electricity short-
ages.22 As a result, less money is spent delivering interven-
tions and fewer DALYs are averted (see Columns 7 and 
9 in table 2, respectively.) This results in a gap between 
current and potential spend of $198 million. One 
possible way of investing this spending gap is on policies 
to improve implementation levels, for specific interven-
tions or across the HCS. Which interventions to invest in 
depends on the health gains that could be achieved by 
such investments. Table 2 ranks interventions by financial 
value to the HCS (Column 12).
For example, schistosomiasis mass drug administration 
is only available to 13% of the eligible patient population. 
If it were fully implemented, it would avert 23 754 DALYs 
(vs only 3088 at actual implementation levels). Table 3 
presents the calculations underlying the values reported 
in table 2. Using the $61 per DALY averted estimate of 
health opportunity costs, if fully implemented, schistoso-
miasis mass drug administration would have a net effect of 
12 562 DALYs averted (vs 1633 at actual implementation). 
As such, scaling up from actual levels of implementation 
to 100% would result in an additional 10 929 net DALYs 
averted (the difference between net DALYs averted at 
full and actual implementation (Column 3), equivalent 
to a $670 393 value to the HCS (Column 4). This means 
that, at most, $670 393 could be spent on removing the 
constraints to implementing schistosomiasis mass drug 
administration for that to remain a cost-effective use of 
resources.
Aggregating the total DALYs averted at 100% imple-
mentation across the interventions in the package 
(49.5 million) and subtracting the total DALYs averted at 
actual implementation (11.4 million) gives the maximum 
health gains that system strengthening could achieve 
(38.0 million DALYs averted). This suggests that there 
are potentially substantial gains from investing in policies 
which reduce or remove constraints to implementation 
at the intervention level and across the HCS as a whole.
should the package be expanded to include additional 
interventions?
The Ministry of Health could accept existing constraints 
and instead use the budget spending gap resulting from 
constraints on full implementation to fund the inclusion 
of additional interventions not included in the initial 
package (ie, any intervention with cost per DALY averted 
estimates greater than $61). Whether this should be 
judged as a good use of money depends on the DALYs 
that can be averted by the additional interventions at 
actual implementation levels.
Using the spending gap ($198 million) to include 
interventions 49–67 would avert 2.7 million additional 
DALYs, resulting in a total of 14.2 million DALYs averted. 
This is 35.3 million fewer DALYs than could potentially 
be averted by investing in policies to improve implemen-
tation of already included interventions. This suggests 
that investing in implementation efforts should be prior-
itised if there are effective ways to relax the constraints. 
Although the effectiveness of such policies is often 
unknown, understanding the scale of the potential 
benefits can support informed judgements by decision 
makers. For example, even if only 14% of the potential 
health gains of implementation efforts were achieved 
using the spending gap it would be preferable to package 
expansion with that money. Furthermore, expanding 
the package may adversely impact the implementation 
of higher priority interventions so the additional DALYs 
that could be averted by including additional inter-
ventions probably overestimates the health benefits of 
expanding the package.
What are the costs of the conditionalities of donor funding?
Donors, who fund approximately 70% of the HCS in 
Malawi, may also impose constraints through their 
funding arrangements.23 Analyses comparing the health 
benefits of the donor’s offers of assistance with the health 
opportunity cost can inform a discussion with donors 
about the need to impose constraints on their funding 
and can engage stakeholders in understanding the impli-
cations of particular policy options regarding donor 
offers. Such options may include accepting the donor 
proposal but being clear about the health opportunity 
cost of doing so or rejecting offers of matched funding 
for interventions that do not offer net health benefits. 
Proposals that might make the implementation of high 
 o
n
 3 M
ay 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 on 9 April 2018. Downloaded from 
Ochalek J, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 9
BMJ Global Health
Ta
b
le
 2
 
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 a
t 
fu
ll 
an
d
 a
ct
ua
l i
m
p
le
m
en
ta
tio
n 
le
ve
ls
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
IC
E
R
 
ra
nk
in
g
IC
E
R
 ($
)
P
o
p
. D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 p
er
 
10
00
C
as
es
 p
er
 
an
nu
m
 
(1
00
0 
s)
A
ct
ua
l 
im
p
. 
le
ve
l
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(f
ul
l i
m
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 
ac
tu
al
 im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
Fi
na
nc
ia
l v
al
ue
 
to
 t
he
 h
ea
lt
hc
ar
e 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
m
o
vi
ng
 
fr
o
m
 a
ct
ua
l t
o
 f
ul
l 
im
p
. (
$1
00
0s
)
M
al
e 
ci
rc
um
ci
si
on
38
22
45
40
73
12
%
14
6 
73
0
17
 6
08
39
 6
34
47
56
25
 4
23
30
51
1 
37
2 
31
4
Is
on
ia
zi
d
 p
re
ve
nt
iv
e 
th
er
ap
y 
fo
r 
H
IV
+
 n
o 
(T
B
)
4
1
88
7
55
50
%
80
40
11
18
55
9
10
98
54
9
33
 6
73
Fi
rs
t-
lin
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
fo
r 
ne
w
 T
B
 c
as
es
 fo
r 
ad
ul
ts
5
3
39
3
14
64
%
17
8
11
4
10
45
66
9
10
02
64
1
22
 1
22
Fi
rs
t-
lin
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
fo
r 
ne
w
 T
B
 c
as
es
 fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
7
3
39
3
12
64
%
11
7
75
88
8
56
8
85
1
54
5
18
 7
89
C
le
an
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 im
m
ed
ia
te
 e
ss
en
tia
l n
ew
b
or
n 
ca
re
 (h
om
e)
9
3
36
8
67
1
0%
41
6
–
23
7
– 
22
7
– 
13
 9
09
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 p
re
-e
cl
am
p
si
a 
(m
ag
ne
si
um
 
su
lfa
te
)
23
6
16
8
20
80
%
45
36
53
5
42
8
48
3
38
6
59
23
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
co
un
se
lli
ng
 a
nd
 t
es
tin
g
41
25
40
80
31
15
%
36
 3
09
54
46
16
7
25
98
15
51
20
R
ot
av
iru
s 
va
cc
in
e
22
6
17
7
65
1
0%
30
97
– 
88
– 
80
– 
49
20
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
ow
ni
ng
 a
t 
le
as
t 
on
e 
IT
N
/L
LI
N
33
13
77
67
52
56
%
13
 7
37
77
06
22
8
12
8
18
0
10
1
48
47
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 fi
rs
t 
tr
im
es
te
r—
un
co
m
p
lic
at
ed
19
5
19
8
30
5
33
%
10
25
34
1
10
9
36
10
0
33
40
87
P
M
TC
T
27
11
94
53
55
%
60
0
33
2
15
7
87
13
0
72
35
61
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
—
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 
(a
d
ul
t,
 >
36
 k
g)
13
4
26
0
43
72
2%
11
86
18
59
1
56
1
33
54
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
—
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 
(a
d
ul
t,
 <
36
 k
g)
14
4
26
0
43
72
4%
59
3
21
59
2
56
2
32
85
La
b
ou
r 
an
d
 d
el
iv
er
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
28
11
89
91
8
65
%
12
81
83
3
17
0
11
1
13
9
91
29
92
Fi
rs
t-
lin
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
fo
r 
re
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
TB
 c
as
es
 fo
r 
ad
ul
ts
6
3
39
3
2
65
%
10
0
65
13
1
85
12
5
81
26
88
M
as
s 
m
ed
ia
2
1
90
3
16
 8
79
71
%
76
09
54
02
15
0
10
7
14
8
10
5
26
27
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
 (a
d
ul
t,
 <
36
 k
g)
11
4
26
0
43
72
30
%
34
63
10
39
59
18
56
17
23
83
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 fo
cu
se
d
 o
n 
m
en
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
se
x 
w
ith
 
m
en
48
51
20
34
5%
12
56
63
23
2
12
40
2
23
11
A
nt
en
at
al
 c
ar
e 
(fo
ur
 v
is
its
)
36
15
68
91
8
46
%
11
 2
30
51
10
90
41
68
31
22
89
Fi
rs
t-
lin
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
fo
r 
re
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
TB
 c
as
es
 fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
8
3
39
3
2
65
%
66
43
11
1
72
10
6
69
22
83
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 s
ec
on
d
 t
rim
es
te
r—
un
co
m
p
lic
at
ed
20
5
19
8
30
5
67
%
23
5
15
7
10
9
72
10
0
67
20
47
A
nt
en
at
al
 c
or
tic
os
te
ro
id
s 
fo
r 
p
re
te
rm
 la
b
ou
r
40
25
40
16
5
0%
40
6
– 
47
– 
28
– 
17
18
N
ew
b
or
n 
se
p
si
s—
 fu
ll 
su
p
p
or
tiv
e 
ca
re
39
24
42
81
40
%
41
7
16
7
60
24
37
15
13
46
C
ot
rim
ox
az
ol
e 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
1
co
st
 s
av
in
g
12
7
13
%
22
0
28
0
0
23
3
12
08
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 fo
cu
se
d
 o
n 
fe
m
al
e 
se
x 
w
or
ke
rs
47
51
20
23
30
%
65
5
19
7
16
1
48
28
8
11
84
Va
gi
na
l d
el
iv
er
y,
 s
ki
lle
d
 a
tt
en
d
an
ce
31
12
83
91
8
65
%
51
81
33
68
67
43
54
35
11
53
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
 (a
d
ul
t,
 >
36
 k
g)
12
4
26
0
43
72
70
%
42
67
29
87
59
41
56
39
10
21
C
on
tin
ue
d
 o
n
 3 M
ay 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 on 9 April 2018. Downloaded from 
10 Ochalek J, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607
BMJ Global Health
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
IC
E
R
 
ra
nk
in
g
IC
E
R
 ($
)
P
o
p
. D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 p
er
 
10
00
C
as
es
 p
er
 
an
nu
m
 
(1
00
0 
s)
A
ct
ua
l 
im
p
. 
le
ve
l
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(f
ul
l i
m
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 
ac
tu
al
 im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
Fi
na
nc
ia
l v
al
ue
 
to
 t
he
 h
ea
lt
hc
ar
e 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
m
o
vi
ng
 
fr
o
m
 a
ct
ua
l t
o
 f
ul
l 
im
p
. (
$1
00
0s
)
Te
ta
nu
s 
to
xo
id
 (p
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
)
24
7
14
9
91
8
84
%
11
5
96
10
4
87
92
77
90
5
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
—
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 
(c
hi
ld
re
n,
 <
15
 k
g)
17
4
26
0
10
42
2%
35
1
14
0
13
0
79
9
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
—
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 
(c
hi
ld
re
n,
>
15
 k
g)
18
4
26
0
10
42
4%
71
2
14
0
13
0
78
3
S
ch
is
to
so
m
ia
si
s 
m
as
s 
d
ru
g 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
42
29
35
38
9
13
%
77
10
24
3
13
2
67
0
V
ita
m
in
 A
 s
up
p
le
m
en
ta
tio
n 
in
 p
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
25
7
14
0
12
4
65
%
12
5
81
33
22
30
19
63
4
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
 
(c
hi
ld
re
n,
 >
15
 k
g)
16
4
26
0
10
42
40
%
47
68
19
07
14
6
13
5
48
7
A
nt
ib
io
tic
s 
fo
r 
p
P
R
oM
45
40
25
64
30
%
39
12
30
9
10
3
45
0
M
at
er
na
l s
ep
si
s 
ca
se
 m
an
ag
em
en
t
44
39
26
64
0%
27
31
– 
20
– 
7
– 
44
9
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 s
ev
er
e 
m
al
nu
tr
iti
on
 (c
hi
ld
re
n)
46
50
20
51
80
%
24
37
19
49
19
9
15
9
36
29
44
6
Is
on
ia
zi
d
 p
re
ve
nt
iv
e 
th
er
ap
y 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
in
 
co
nt
ac
t 
w
ith
 p
at
ie
nt
s 
w
ith
 T
B
 
3
1
90
0
2
85
%
7
6
45
38
44
38
40
8
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 u
nc
om
p
lic
at
ed
 
(c
hi
ld
re
n,
 <
15
 k
g)
15
4
26
0
10
42
60
%
45
76
27
46
14
8
13
8
32
5
Va
gi
na
l d
el
iv
er
y,
 w
ith
 c
om
p
lic
at
io
n
32
12
83
13
8
51
%
80
4
41
0
10
5
8
4
24
2
M
ea
sl
es
 v
ac
ci
ne
26
9
10
6
65
1
99
%
52
8
52
3
10
7
10
6
90
89
55
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 o
b
st
ru
ct
ed
 la
b
ou
r
30
12
86
92
10
0%
11
00
11
00
24
97
24
97
20
26
20
26
– 
C
ae
sa
re
an
 s
ec
tio
n
43
32
31
34
10
0%
67
2
67
2
32
7
32
7
15
7
15
7
– 
C
ae
sa
re
an
 s
ec
tio
n 
(w
ith
 c
om
p
lic
at
io
n)
29
12
86
5
10
0%
17
2
17
2
13
7
13
7
11
1
11
1
– 
P
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
 s
le
ep
in
g 
un
d
er
 a
n 
IT
N
34
13
77
14
69
10
0%
29
90
29
90
50
50
39
39
– 
U
nd
er
 fi
ve
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ho
 s
le
p
t 
un
d
er
 IT
N
/L
LI
N
35
13
77
49
4
10
0%
10
06
10
06
17
17
13
13
– 
B
lo
od
 s
af
et
y
37
15
66
40
10
0%
16
26
16
26
12
12
9
9
– 
M
al
ar
ia
 t
re
at
m
en
t:
 p
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
—
 
co
m
p
lic
at
ed
21
5
19
8
16
10
0%
14
0
14
0
6
6
5
5
– 
C
as
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 M
D
R
 T
B
 c
as
es
10
3
29
7
0
10
0%
12
12
5
5
5
5
– 
M
al
ar
ia
 tr
ea
tm
en
t:
 p
re
gn
an
t w
om
en
—
co
m
p
lic
at
ed
21
5
19
8
16
10
0%
14
0
14
0
6
6
5
5
– 
C
ae
sa
re
an
 s
ec
tio
n 
(w
ith
 c
om
p
lic
at
io
n)
29
12
86
5
10
0%
17
2
17
2
13
7
13
7
11
1
11
1
– 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 o
b
st
ru
ct
ed
 la
b
ou
r
30
12
86
92
10
0%
11
00
11
00
24
97
24
97
20
26
20
26
– 
P
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
 s
le
ep
in
g 
un
d
er
 a
n 
IT
N
34
13
77
14
69
10
0%
29
90
29
90
50
50
39
39
– 
U
nd
er
 fi
ve
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ho
 s
le
p
t 
un
d
er
 IT
N
/L
LI
N
35
13
77
49
4
10
0%
10
06
10
06
17
17
13
13
– 
B
lo
od
 s
af
et
y
37
15
66
40
10
0%
16
26
16
26
12
12
9
9
– 
C
ae
sa
r e
an
 s
ec
tio
n
43
32
31
34
10
0%
67
2
67
2
32
7
32
7
15
7
15
7
– 
Ta
b
le
 2
 
C
on
tin
ue
d
 
C
on
tin
ue
d
 o
n
 3 M
ay 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 on 9 April 2018. Downloaded from 
Ochalek J, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 11
BMJ Global Health
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
IC
E
R
 
ra
nk
in
g
IC
E
R
 ($
)
P
o
p
. D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 p
er
 
10
00
C
as
es
 p
er
 
an
nu
m
 
(1
00
0  
s)
A
ct
ua
l 
im
p
. 
le
ve
l
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(f
ul
l i
m
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l c
o
st
 
(a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
$1
00
0s
)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
To
ta
l D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (a
ct
ua
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 (f
ul
l 
im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
N
et
 D
A
LY
s 
av
er
te
d
 
ac
tu
al
 im
p
.; 
10
00
s)
Fi
na
nc
ia
l v
al
ue
 
to
 t
he
 h
ea
lt
hc
ar
e 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
m
o
vi
ng
 
fr
o
m
 a
ct
ua
l t
o
 f
ul
l 
im
p
. (
$1
00
0s
)
IP
T 
(p
re
gn
an
t 
w
om
en
)
52
11
0
9
73
5
10
0%
35
35
0
0
−
0
−
0
– 
G
IT
 c
an
ce
r
63
80
4
1
0
50
%
3
1
0
0
−
0
−
0
−
0
C
er
vi
ca
l c
an
ce
r 
(fi
rs
t 
lin
e)
65
10
87
1
2
50
%
16
2
81
0
0
−
0
−
0
−
0
Is
ch
ae
m
ic
 h
ea
rt
 d
is
ea
se
61
45
3
2
12
8
15
%
4
1
0
0
−
0
−
0
−
2
D
ia
b
et
es
, t
yp
e 
I
57
29
6
3
23
15
%
43
04
64
6
0
0
−
0
−
0
−
5
H
ig
h 
ch
ol
es
te
ro
l
49
68
15
22
3
1%
67
03
67
1
0
−
0
−
0
−
6
B
as
ic
 p
sy
ch
os
oc
ia
l s
up
p
or
t,
 a
d
vi
ce
 a
nd
 fo
llo
w
-
up
, p
lu
s 
an
tie
p
ile
p
tic
 m
ed
ic
at
io
n
50
82
12
50
6
3%
12
66
38
1
0
−
0
−
0
−
14
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
of
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
56
26
5
4
16
9
1%
33
2
3
0
0
−
0
−
0
−
23
D
ia
b
et
es
, T
yp
e 
II
58
29
6
3
13
8
15
%
42
11
63
2
0
0
−
1
−
0
−
30
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
of
 a
cu
te
 p
sy
ch
ot
ic
 d
is
or
d
er
s
66
16
46
1
16
9
1%
95
8
10
0
0
−
1
−
0
−
42
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
of
 b
ip
ol
ar
 d
is
or
d
er
62
55
7
2
52
3
3%
10
 3
62
32
1
0
0
−
1
−
0
−
87
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
of
 s
ch
iz
op
hr
en
ia
67
16
46
1
23
63
14
%
13
 4
13
18
78
0
0
−
10
−
1
−
51
2
H
yp
er
te
ns
io
n
55
15
9
6
84
6
10
%
13
38
13
4
44
4
−
71
−
7
−
39
12
O
R
S
54
15
3
7
86
62
69
%
93
7
64
7
14
7
10
2
−
22
1
−
15
2
−
41
97
Z
in
c 
(d
ia
rr
ho
ea
 t
re
at
m
en
t)
51
99
10
74
55
0%
17
88
– 
24
4
– 
−
15
0
– 
−
92
07
C
on
d
om
s
53
12
7
8
80
31
47
%
22
 8
83
10
 7
55
48
2
22
6
−
51
7
−
24
3
−
16
 8
13
A
R
T 
fo
r 
m
en
59
31
2
3
33
2
75
%
21
 1
59
15
 9
61
10
05
75
8
−
41
04
−
3,
09
6
−
61
 8
48
A
R
T 
fo
r 
w
om
en
60
31
2
3
50
9
82
%
32
 4
40
26
 6
69
15
41
12
67
−
62
92
−
5,
17
3
−
68
 6
65
P
ae
d
ia
tr
ic
 A
R
T
64
89
2
1
10
7
25
%
76
57
18
92
15
56
38
4
−
21
 0
74
−
5,
20
6
−
97
3 
33
4
A
R
T,
 a
nt
ire
tr
ov
ira
l t
he
ra
p
y;
 D
A
LY
, d
is
ab
ili
ty
 a
d
ju
st
ed
 li
fe
 y
ea
r;
 G
IT
, g
as
tr
oi
nt
es
tin
al
; I
C
E
R
, i
nc
re
m
en
ta
l c
os
t 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tio
; I
P
T,
 in
te
rm
itt
en
t 
p
re
ve
nt
iv
e 
th
er
ap
y;
 IT
N
, i
ns
ec
tic
id
e-
tr
ea
te
d
 b
ed
 n
et
; L
LI
N
, l
on
g-
la
st
in
g 
in
se
ct
ic
id
al
 n
et
; M
D
R
, m
ul
tid
ru
g 
re
si
st
an
t;
 O
R
S
, o
ra
l r
eh
yd
ra
tio
n 
sa
lts
; P
M
TC
T,
 p
re
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 m
ot
he
r 
to
 c
hi
ld
 t
ra
ns
m
is
si
on
; p
P
R
oM
, p
re
te
rm
 p
re
m
at
ur
e 
ru
p
tu
re
 o
f m
em
b
ra
ne
s;
 T
B
, t
ub
er
cu
lo
si
s.
Ta
b
le
 2
 
C
on
tin
ue
d
 
 o
n
 3 M
ay 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607 on 9 April 2018. Downloaded from 
12 Ochalek J, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000607. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000607
BMJ Global Health
priority interventions more difficult might be mitigated 
by other policies (eg, use of user fees to deter uptake of 
the imposed intervention). The framework provides esti-
mates of the health opportunity cost of the constraints 
that a donor proposal might impose, which provide a 
valuable basis for explaining decisions to stakeholders.
When an intervention that is not cost-effective is 
included it always reduces the total health generated 
by the package. The difference in the health gains asso-
ciated with a health maximising package that uses all 
available resources, including those provided by donors, 
and a package where the donor specifies that particular 
interventions be included as a condition of the resources 
provided, indicates the minimum health opportunity 
cost of these restrictions. For example, requiring that 
first-line treatment for cervical cancer (intervention #65 
in figure 1) is included in the package as a condition of 
existing levels of assistance will not increase the budget, 
so the health opportunity cost of this requirement is the 
health that would have been gained by the interventions 
that must be removed to accommodate it. The health 
opportunity cost of these types of conditions will be 
higher if it is not the least cost-effective interventions that 
are displaced and/or if they make other higher priority 
interventions more difficult to implement. Other exam-
ples of how different types of restrictions on assistance 
can be assessed are illustrated in online supplemen-
tary file 1. Evidence of the scale of the health opportu-
nity costs associated with restrictions and conditions on 
donor assistance enables a more informed and account-
able negotiation between stakeholders including careful 
examination of the reasons for restrictions.
How can objectives beyond improving population health be 
considered?
Inevitably, the Ministry of Health and stakeholders may 
want to consider a range of objectives in addition to 
gains in population health when making decisions about 
what interventions to include in the EHP. These might 
include, for example, using interventions to promote 
financial protection or to reduce health inequalities and 
recognising the impact of interventions on wider social 
objectives such as productivity. In principle, it is possible 
to extend the measures of benefit and opportunity cost to 
include these other considerations.24 25 In practice, this 
may be challenging based on available evidence, in which 
case it is possible to inform decisions about relevant 
trade-offs based on changes in population health.26 The 
health losses associated with including an intervention 
that would not be included on the basis of net benefit 
alone can be quantified in the same way as the health 
losses associated with conditions on donor funding. 
These can be weighed against the gains in other objec-
tives that result from the inclusion of the intervention. 
This quantification provides policy makers with a basis 
to understand whether the trade-offs are worth making 
and a means of communicating their ultimate decisions 
to stakeholders.
ApplICATIon of THe frAMeWork To THe developMenT of 
A revIsed eHp In MAlAWI
This analysis is intended to provide an analytic frame-
work which can be used to support rather than prescribe 
decisions. The framework and data supporting the 
initial analysis were shared with the Ministry of Health 
in Malawi, which mandated an already existing EHP 
Technical Working Group (TWG) to conduct the EHP 
revision process (including the Ministry of Health Heads 
of Departments and Programme Managers, technical 
partners such as the local WHO office, donors, academic 
institutions and other key national health stakeholders). 
The TWG added other criteria to health maximisation 
including: equity (whether an intervention targeted at 
risk or marginalised groups); continuum of care (where 
interventions are linked, eg, screening and treating); 
complementarities (whether interventions are part of 
package) and exceptional donor funded interventions 
(donor funding for interventions that were expected to 
remain largely stable in the medium term). The frame-
work was used to quantify the health gains that would 
result from different choices of interventions that met 
the agreed criteria to varying degrees, enabling explicit 
consideration of the necessary trade-offs between 
maximising health and other objectives. The EHP TWG 
presented their draft package to District Health Officers 
and then the Ministry of Health management for 
approval. The whole process was facilitated by Ministry of 
Health economists.
The final agreed package costed $247 million per year 
and was predicted to avert 41.5 million DALYs if fully 
implemented. Like both previous packages, the cost of 
this package is more than the resources budgeted for 
it. However, it costs 31% less than the 2011 package 
($362 million) and averts 92% as many DALYs. As such, it 
offers better value for money overall than its predecessor, 
implying significant progress towards a package that is 
more realistic and less aspirational.17 This also highlights 
that there are valuable health gains from expanding the 
budget for the package to its full cost. An example of 
the deliberative process undertaken by the Ministry of 
Health, alongside the analysis, was the decision not to 
Table 3 Valuing scaleup: schistosomiasis mass drug 
administration
Total 
DALYs 
averted
Total 
cost ($)
Net 
DALYs 
averted
Financial value 
to the healthcare 
system ($)
Full 
implementation 23 754 76 527 12 562 770 567
Actual 
implementation 3088 9949 1633 100 174
Value of moving 
from actual to full 
implementation 20 666 66 578 10 929 670 393
DALY, disability adjusted life year.
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include male circumcision in the final EHP despite the 
analysis showing it to be a ‘best buy’ intervention. It was 
judged that the type of demand-side constraints which 
would need to be overcome to increase the implemen-
tation levels would be too great and render the interven-
tion not cost-effective.
The conditionalities of donors were considered in the 
process, particularly with respect to funding from the 
Global Fund and GAVI towards HIV and immunisation, 
respectively. After deliberation, the decision taken was to 
include many of the interventions funded by these organ-
isations in the package, regardless of their cost-effective-
ness, reflecting a lack of flexibility in health financing 
in Malawi and in the role of donors. The framework, 
however, provided a means to initiate conversation about 
the impact of a high proportion of earmarked funding 
within the health sector and the subsequent effect on 
population health.
The framework was augmented through further 
data collection on the additional criteria deemed 
important in package design within Malawi. Data in 
these fields were largely populated through expert elic-
itation. A benefit of the framework is its adaptable use 
in the policy-making environment. Additional data can 
be combined with the framework to the extent desired 
and possible. Within Malawi, quantitative data on other 
criteria considered for inclusion in the decision-making 
process (eg, financial risk protection) proved scarce, 
leading to the decision to focus primarily on health maxi-
misation with other criteria for which data were elicitable 
from expert judgement considered within the delibera-
tive process.
There were a number of limitations and challenges in 
using the analytic framework to revise the Malawi EHP. 
Initially there was limited understanding of opportunity 
cost, cost-effectiveness and budget constraint principles 
by some stakeholders. While the EHP TWG agreed on 
inclusion criteria, adhering to the implications of these 
choices was difficult in practice. In part, this was due 
to low total health expenditure per capita, $39, which 
suggested a much more restricted package than previous 
unaffordable packages. The historical vertical funding 
arrangements also meant that there was limited willing-
ness by Heads of Departments and Programme Managers 
to consider disinvestment in their own interventions.
By applying the framework to data from Malawi, this 
study illustrates how metrics of value that reflect health 
opportunity costs can provide a principled and evidence-
based support to decision-making processes. Specifi-
cally, they can quantify the health opportunity costs of 
constraints that inhibit delivering interventions fully; 
donor constraints on how funding is spent and the inclu-
sion of objectives additional to improving population 
health.
Such analysis forms a critical part of package design. 
However, it also emphasises the important role of the 
decision-making process and how it interacts with anal-
ysis. As evidenced in the framework’s application in 
Malawi, that process needs to, for example, define the 
objectives of the package, deliberate on the relevance of 
the evidence provided by analysis and to make final deci-
sions around what should (or should not) be included in 
the package.27 To ensure that it can be implemented, the 
package should also inform other health systems inputs 
and standards, such as treatment guidelines, essential 
medicines lists and payment or reimbursement mecha-
nisms, which currently are not typically informed by such 
economic criteria. This can also inform broader ques-
tions such as the benefits of moving to a whole system 
approach to funding. For example, where funding is 
vertical and tied to one specific disease as is commonly 
the case, the health opportunity cost of this type of plan-
ning as opposed to a whole-system approach can be iden-
tified. The analysis also provides quantification of the 
health benefit of expanding the health sector budget 
and, therefore, clarifies trade-offs with other claims on 
public finance.
Inevitably the evidence available to conduct this anal-
ysis was limited in a number of respects. The interven-
tions included in the analysis in this paper are those for 
which data were readily available on costs, health effects, 
the size of the patient population and actual levels of 
implementation. There were a number of interventions 
where some but not all of these data were available or 
were reported in ways that were not useful. There are 
also likely to be complementarities and interactions 
between interventions for which there is little evidence 
and have not been addressed, although the analysis can 
be extended to consider the cost and effects of different 
combinations of interventions. The analysis suggests that 
there are potentially substantial gains from investing in 
policies which reduce or remove constraints to imple-
mentation at the intervention level and across the HCS 
as a whole. However, additional evidence is needed about 
the cost and effects of specific policies and projects that 
could improve the implementation of high priority 
interventions.
ConClusIon
This study has illustrated the value of an analytic frame-
work, founded on an understanding of the health oppor-
tunity costs of funding choices. It offers a transparent, 
principles-based approach to informing the content 
and scale of a HBP with existing resources, the value of 
expanding the HBP and the incremental reallocation 
of resources within the package. The paper has further 
shown that, even in the most evidence sparse of envi-
ronments, available information can be marshalled and 
analysis presented in a way that empowers policy-makers 
and facilitates engagement of stakeholders in making 
explicit, accountable and evidence-based decisions on 
how limited resources can best be employed to improve 
population health. The Malawi case shows that the 
analytic framework is not prescriptive but rather a tool to 
guide decision-making that reflects the context in which 
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they are made and which can be adapted and applied to 
different settings.
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